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DISPARATE IMPACT OR NEGATIVE
IMPACT?: THE FUTURE OF NON-
INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
CLAIMS BROUGHT BY THE ELDERLY
Sandra F. Sperino
In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) as permitting plaintiffs to proceed under a disparate impact theory of
discrimination. This decision affirms that plaintiffs who are at least forty years old
may challenge employment decisions resulting from policies that are neutral on their
face but have a disproportionate impact on individuals in the protected class.
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the Hon. Donald J. Stohr of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,
from 1999 to 2001. Thereafter, Professor Sperino was an attorney for the law firm of
Lewis, Rice & Fingersh, LC, in St. Louis, Mo., where she practiced labor and employ-
ment law, commercial litigation, and appellate litigation. Professor Sperino is a mem-
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Although this decision was heralded as a new tool to fight age discrimination in
employment, Professor Sperino argues that the decision will have serious and
detrimental effects on the ability of elderly employees to seek redress for unfavorable
employment decisions. Professor Sperino states that the Supreme Court, while finally
recognizing that "disparate impact" claims are viable under the ADEA, also placed
many obstacles in the way of litigants who want to challenge such policies. These new
obstacles, along with decreased incentives for elderly plaintiffs to pursue disparate
impact claims, will result in many potential claims being abandoned or being pursued
unsuccessfully.
I. Introduction
On March 30, 2005, the Supreme Court issued
its decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, recognizing the
viability of disparate impact claims under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.' In reporting this decision, the popular press
announced that the Supreme Court took a "pro-worker
interpretation"2 of the ADEA that "lower[ed] the bar over age
discrimination"3 and made it "easier... to sue."4 Linda Greenhouse,
in an article written for the New York Times News Service went so far
as to pronounce that the decision was a "boon" for age-bias lawsuits.5
In one sense the case did expand the theories available to plain-
tiffs under the ADEA by definitively holding that plaintiffs may pro-
ceed under a disparate impact analysis. Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision, five circuit courts held that the ADEA did not permit ad-
vancement of a disparate impact claim.6 However, the Smith decision
1. Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, A Boon to Age-Bias Suits, DESERET MORNING
NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Mar. 31, 2005, at A01.
3. U.S. Supreme Court Lowers the Bar over Age Discrimination, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Apr. 1, 2005, at C2.
4. Charles Lane, Ruling Eases Way for Age Bias Lawsuits, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Mar. 31, 2005, at Al.
5. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 2.
6. See infra Part IV.B. This article is concerned with disparate impact claims
under the ADEA, as opposed to disparate treatment claims. The Supreme Court
has provided the following succinct description of the two types of claims:
"Disparate treatment"... is the most easily understood type of dis-
crimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably
than others because of their race, color, religion [or other protected
characteristics.] Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it
can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment .... [C]laims that stress "disparate impact" [by contrast]
involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treat-
ment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one
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also placed severe limitations on the use of the disparate impact the-
ory in the age discrimination context. These restrictions make dispa-
rate impact claims based on age an even less attractive claim for plain-
tiffs than similar claims under Title VII,7 which are already
underutilized by litigants. The Supreme Court's opinion in Smith also
highlights a growing unease in the courts about the ability of statistics
alone to establish age discrimination.
This article argues that the Smith decision and other recent rul-
ings in ADEA disparate impact cases severely affect elderly workers'
incentives to prosecute and prove disparate impact claims, even more
so than younger workers within the ADEA's protected class.' The
root cause of this disparity is the ADEA's damages provision and
other practical realities, which afford elderly plaintiffs (and their at-
torneys) less opportunity to obtain large judgments in their favor, as
compared to younger litigants. Given the decreased availability of
damages and the difficulty and expense that already attends the
prosecution of any disparate impact claim, elderly plaintiffs have
fewer incentives to pursue a disparate impact claim than other liti-
group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.
Proof of discriminatory motive.., is not required under a disparate-
impact theory.
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
7. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2000),
prohibits certain employers from using discriminatory employment practices
based on a person's race, color, religion, national origin, or gender.
8. When the article refers to the protected class or the protected group, it is
referring to all individuals who are at least forty years of age and protected by the
ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2000). For the purposes of this article, the term "eld-
erly" is defined to include all individuals aged sixty and older. Although the au-
thor acknowledges that defining the term "elderly" is problematic, there is ample
support for defining the term as including all individuals aged sixty and older.
See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 52D(a) (LexisNexis 1999) (defining elderly as
individuals aged sixty and over); Margaret F. Brinig et al., The Public Choice of Elder
Abuse Law, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 532 n.31 (2004) (noting that most of the applica-
ble state statutes defined the term "elderly" to include individuals who had
reached the age of sixty); Carolyn L. Dessin, Financial Abuse of the Elderly: Is the So-
lution a Problem, 34 McGEORGE L. REv. 267, 295 nn.146-47 (2003) (citing statutes
that protect individuals aged sixty and over). It should be noted that the term can
be, and has been, defined differently. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1471(b)(3) (2000) (federal
statute for rural elderly housing assistance defining elderly as sixty-two years old
and older); Treas. Reg. § 1.190-2(a)(4) (2002) (defining an "elderly individual" as a
person who is sixty-five years old or above); Brinig, supra, at 532 n.31 (noting that
one state statue defines the term as over age fifty-five and others age sixty-five and
over); Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and
the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1287 (2004) (defining the term "elderly" to mean
over age sixty-five).
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gants. Any factor that makes it more difficult for elderly litigants to
prove an ADEA disparate impact claim shifts the calculus even fur-
ther in the direction of foregoing such claims.
Not only do elderly workers have fewer incentives to pursue
disparate impact claims, but it is also more difficult for these indi-
viduals to establish that a policy had a disparate impact on them. As
discussed in more detail below, given the limited number of elderly
employees within the work force, there are likely to be few elderly in-
dividuals at any one workplace. If a particular employment practice
has a disparate impact only on elderly workers, it is likely that the
number of workers at a given workplace will not be enough to create
a statistically significant sample for comparison. This makes it diffi-
cult for elderly plaintiffs to assert disparate impact claims against
practices that affect only those over the age of sixty. Any change in
disparate impact law that heightens the requirements for establishing
a disparate impact makes it less likely that elderly workers will be
able to prove their statistical case.
Further, there is a growing recognition and acceptance among
the courts that employment practices can have a disparate impact on
older individuals without necessarily being discriminatory. As rec-
ognized in Smith, "age, unlike race or other classifications protected
by Title VII, not uncommonly has relevance to an individual's capac-
ity to engage in certain types of employment."9 Additionally, the Su-
preme Court itself has declared that age discrimination is less prone to
occur within the workplace than other types of discrimination." This
apparent skepticism about disparate impact claims based on age will
provide district courts with an enhanced ability to grant summary
judgment in favor of defendants, even when a statistical disparity ex-
ists. Such skepticism will be especially problematic for elderly liti-
gants, who, more than others within the protected class, are likely to
face increased scrutiny about their ability to remain in the work force.
This article begins in Part II by undertaking a historical review of
the disparate impact theory of discrimination1 under both the ADEA
9. Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1545 (2005).
10. Id.
11. Commentators continue to debate, in the ADEA context, whether dispa-
rate impact and disparate treatment are separate claims or simply separate eviden-
tiary rules for proving the same cause of action-discrimination. For a good dis-
cussion of this issue, see Michael Evan Gold, Disparate Impact Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 12-14
(2004). Any reference in this article regarding disparate impact claims or disparate
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and Title VII. Part III discusses the Supreme Court's holding in the
Smith case. In Part IV, the discussion focuses on the disparate impact
landscape prior to Smith, with an emphasis on the functional realities
that lessen the incentives for, and the ability of, elderly litigants to
pursue disparate impact claims. Part V of the article examines the dif-
ficulties that elderly plaintiffs will have in proceeding under a dispa-
rate impact theory. Finally, Part VI notes the few positive aspects of
the Smith decision from the plaintiff's perspective.
II. A Historical Review of Significant Disparate Impact
Developments
A. Passage of the ADEA
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of an individual's gender, na-
tional origin, sex, race, color, or religion.12 During the debate leading
to the passage of the Act, Congress considered adding provisions to
Title VII to also prohibit age discrimination. 3 Instead of amending
Title VII, Congress directed Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz to "make
a full and complete study of the factors which might tend to result in
discrimination in employment because of age and of the consequences
of such discrimination on the economy and individuals affected" and
to propose remedial legislation. 4
The report Wirtz delivered to Congress advocated that action be
taken to prohibit discrimination in employment based on age; how-
ever, the report also indicated that age discrimination was different
than the types of discrimination Congress had prohibited in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.15 Wirtz noted that unlike other forms of discrimi-
nation, age discrimination is not typically based on dislike of an indi-
impact evidentiary standards are merely descriptive of disparate impact itself, as
there is no intention to make any comment regarding this larger issue, which is
outside the scope of this article.
12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2000)).
13. Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788 Before the S.
Comm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 90th Cong. 29 (1967) (state-
ment of Sen. Smathers); 113 CONG. REC. 23, 31254 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits).
14. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1540.
15. Joint Appendix at *36-37, Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 125 S. Ct. 1536
(2005) (No. 03-1160), 2004 WL 2289230 (Willard Wirtz, The Older American
Worker Age Discrimination in Employment Report of the Secretary of Labor to the
Congress Under Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act, Letter of Transmittal).
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vidual or intolerance for the entire protected group.16 Instead, Wirtz
found that the most problematic type of discrimination facing older
workers was "discrimination based on unsupported general assump-
tions about the effect of age on ability."17
While Wirtz recognized that age discrimination did exist, he also
noted that older workers might be disparately affected by factors that
correlate with age, but that are not discriminatory. Wirtz noted that
declining health among older workers may make them less able to
perform job functions and may keep them out of the job force."8 He
indicated that either some older workers lack the educational skills
required for newer jobs or younger workers have better educational
credentials for these positions.19 The report also emphasized that
rapid technological advances may leave older workers with outdated
skills in the workplace.2" Wirtz's recognition that age may sometimes
correlate with other reasonable, nondiscriminatory job factors plays
an important role in the development of disparate impact analysis
under the ADEA.
In 1967, Congress enacted the ADEA.21 Congress indicated that
the purpose of the ADEA was "to promote employment of older per-
sons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers
find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on em-
ployment."22 Congress listed four specific employment practices that
it was concerned about, indicating that "older workers find them-
selves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and espe-
cially to regain employment when displaced from jobs," that "the set-
ting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job performance
has become a common practice" and that older workers should be
promoted based on their ability.' Thus, the ADEA made it unlawful
for an employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
16. Id. at *43.
17. Id.
18. Id. at *58.
19. Id.
20. Id. at *62.
21. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81
Stat. 602; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000) (current version of ADEA with
amendments added after the initial enactment).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
23. Id. § 621(a)-(b).
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ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's age."
24
As originally enacted, the ADEA only prohibited discrimination
against individuals who were at least forty years of age and who were
not older than sixty.25 Congress subsequently increased the protection
of the Act to those aged forty to seventy,26 and in 1986 amended the
ADEA to eliminate the upper age limit.27 In its current iteration, the
ADEA protects individuals who have reached the age of forty from
unlawful discrimination.28
The statutory text of the ADEA provides certain instances in
which an action will not be considered to violate the Act. For exam-
ple, an employer may make an employment decision based on age if
age is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
1,29ryth
the normal operation of the particular business, may "observe the
terms of a bona fide seniority system that is not intended to evade the
purposes" of the ADEA,3" and may observe the terms of a bona fide
employee benefit plan.3' The ADEA also expressly provides that an
employer may discharge or discipline an employee for good cause.32
Additionally, the ADEA permits compulsory retirement at the age of
sixty-five for certain individuals classified as "bona fide executives" or
"high policymakers" under specified circumstances.
33
Most importantly for the purposes of this article, the ADEA con-
tains specific language allowing an employer to take an action "where
the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age." 34 As
discussed in more detail in Part III.B., below, Title VII does not contain
this same exception, which is commonly referred to as the RFOA ex-
ception. The presence of the RFOA exception in the ADEA is an im-
24. Id. § 623(a)(2).
25. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 12,
81 Stat. at 607.
26. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-256, § 12, 92 Stat. 189, 189 (1978).
27. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
592, § 2(c), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342 (1986).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a).
29. Id. § 623(0(1).
30. Id. § 623(f)(2)(A).
31. Id. § 623(f)(2)(B).
32. Id. § 623(f)(3).
33. Id. § 631(c)(1).
34. Id. § 623(0(1).
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portant factor in the Smith decision's differentiation between the dis-
parate impact analysis under the ADEA and other causes of action.
B. Development of Disparate Impact Law: Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.
Because the ADEA, like the originally enacted Title VII, con-
tained no specific wording providing for a disparate impact cause of
action, it would remain for the courts to determine whether plaintiffs
were required to prove intentional discrimination or could establish
discrimination where no discriminatory animus was present. The U.S.
Supreme Court examined the disparate impact theory in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., a Title VII case.'
The background facts of Griggs are important to understanding
the theoretical underpinnings of disparate impact claims. The plain-
tiffs in Griggs were a class of African American employees currently
employed at, or who were job applicants at, the Dan River Steam Sta-
tion of the Duke Power Plant, a power generating facility in North
Carolina. 6 The district court had found that the company openly dis-
criminated against African American employees in its hiring and
placement practices prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.
37
The plant discriminated against African American employees by
limiting their placement to only one of the plant's five operational
units-the Labor Department.' The highest paid employees in the
Labor Department were paid less than the lowest paid employees in
other departments, who were all white.39
In 1955, the company implemented a policy requiring job appli-
cants for every department-other than the Labor Department-to
possess a high school diploma.4' The policy also required employees
wanting to move from the Coal Handling Department to one of the
other three non-Labor Departments to possess a high school di-
35. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
36. Id. at 426; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1227 (4th Cir. 1970).
37. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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ploma.41 Employees who wanted to change positions between other
departments were not required to have a high school education.42
The company subsequently abandoned its policy of limiting em-
ployment opportunities for African Americans to the Labor Depart-
ment.43 However, when it did so, it implemented a new policy requir-
ing that anyone who wanted to transfer from the Labor Department to
any other department possess a high school diploma.' White em-
ployees hired by the company prior to 1955 who wanted to transfer
from any operating division (other than the Coal Handling Depart-
ment) were not required to possess a high school diploma.45
On July 2, 1965, the day on which Title VII became effective, the
plant implemented a new policy requiring individuals who wanted to
be placed in any unit, other than the Labor Department, to possess
both a high school diploma and to pass two standardized aptitude
tests.46 Incumbent employees, who had been employed by the com-
pany prior to the implementation of this new policy, were allowed to
transfer departments if they possessed a high school diploma or if
they passed two standardized tests.47
The district court found that the company's intentional discrimi-
nation ceased as of the date that Title VII became effective.4 ' Finding
no current intentional discrimination, the district court determined
that the plaintiffs' class could not prevail on its discrimination
claims.49 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this portion of
the district court's order, holding that if an employer had a valid
business purpose in adopting educational and testing requirements
and did so without an intent to discriminate, future applicants for the
positions must comply with the requirements and could not prevail
under Title VII. 50
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 427-28.
47. Id. at 428.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970). The court
of appeals found that the high school education requirement for individuals to be
promoted out of the Labor Department was discriminatory for those employees
who already worked at the plant at the time the policy was implemented because
white employees in other departments were not required to have a high school
education.
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In reversing the lower courts' decisions, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that it was not questioning the lower courts' findings that the
defendant had ceased to intentionally discriminate against employees
after Title VII became effective."1 Rather, the Court held that any prac-
tice that excludes members of a protected class and that cannot be
shown to be job related is prohibited by Title VII.5 2 In its oft-quoted
passage, the Court indicated: "good intent or absence of discrimina-
tory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups
and are unrelated to measuring job capability."53 The Griggs Court
thus recognized the disparate impact theory of employment discrimi-
nation under Title VII.
C. Further Refinement of Disparate Impact: Wards Cove
After Griggs established that disparate impact was a viable the-
ory under Title VII, the lower courts struggled with the burdens of
persuasion and production each party would bear in a disparate im-
pact case. To answer this question, the Court accepted the case of
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.'
The plaintiffs in Wards Cove were individuals who worked in
Alaskan salmon canneries.5 5 Each summer during the salmon run, the
canneries opened to process the fresh salmon. The canneries classified
available jobs into two general categories: cannery jobs and noncan-
nery jobs. The cannery jobs were unskilled positions in which work-
ers canned salmon on the cannery line. The noncannery jobs con-
sisted of a variety of jobs, including machinists, engineers, quality
control personnel, cooks, carpenters, store-keepers, bookkeepers, and
other support personnel. 6
Individuals employed in the cannery jobs were predominantly
Filipinos and Alaskan natives, while the individuals in the noncan-
nery jobs were mostly white.57 The cannery workers alleged that sev-
eral of the canneries' hiring and promotion practices, such as nepo-
tism, a rehire preference, a lack of objective hiring criteria, separate
51. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
55. Id. at 646-48.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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hiring channels, and a practice of not promoting from within, created
a racially imbalanced work force. 8
In ruling on the disparate impact claims, the Court laid out a
three-part framework for courts and litigants to use in evaluating dis-
parate impact cases. First, the plaintiff is required to establish a prima
facie case of disparate impact by demonstrating that a specific practice
of the defendant has a "significantly disparate impact" on a protected
group.59 Once the plaintiff has met this burden, the burden shifts to
the defendant to articulate a legitimate business justification for the
practice.6' However, the Court indicated that to meet its burden, the
defendant cannot set forth any justification for the practice; rather, the
defendant must set forth reasons why the challenged practice "serves,
in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the em-
ployer.",61 The Court emphasized that the burden of persuasion in a
disparate impact case always remained with the plaintiff.
62
After the employer has met its burden of articulation, the Wards
Cove analysis allows the plaintiff to prevail by proving at least one of
the following: First, the employee could convince the court that the
employer's justification for its business practice did not serve the le-
gitimate goals of the employer.~' The employee could also prevail by
persuading the fact finder that "other tests or selection devices, with-
out a similarly undesirable ... effect, would also serve the employer's
legitimate... interest[s]."'  The Court reasoned that if other nondis-
criminatory selection devices existed, it was reasonable to believe that
the employer had chosen the selection device as a pretext for dis-
crimination.'
By placing the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff and by re-
quiring the employer only to articulate a legitimate reason for its con-
duct, the Wards Cove analysis for disparate impact claims "tipp[ed] the
scales in favor of employers. "66
58. Id.
59. Id. at 658.
60. Id. at 659.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 660-61.
65. Id. In 1998, the Supreme Court further held that disparate impact claims
could be brought to challenge not only objective tests like the one presented in
Griggs, but also subjective employment practices. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989 (1998).
66. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 673.
NUM13ER 2
350 The Elder Law Journal
D. Congress Reacts: Post-Wards Cove Developments
The evidentiary framework set forth by the Supreme Court in
Wards Cove would prove to be short lived in the context of Title VII.
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress amended Title VII to ex-
pressly recognize disparate impact claims and to alter the burdens of
production and persuasion outlined in Wards Cove. 67 To accomplish
this objective, Congress added the following language to Title VII:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this title only if-
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent
uses a particular employment practice that causes a dispa-
rate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that
the challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party [suggests an] alternative em-
ployment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such
alternative employment practice.68
Not only did Congress codify disparate impact as a separate
claim under Title VII and legislate the burdens of production and per-
suasion for such claims, it also limited the employer's ability to re-
spond to disparate impact claims through quotas or other methods.
Congress prohibited employers from "adjust[ing] the scores of,
us[ing] different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter[ing] the results of,
employment[-]related tests on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."'69
The 1991 amendments to Title VII also bifurcated the damages
provisions, depending on whether a plaintiff prevailed on a disparate
impact claim or a disparate treatment claim. In addition to the other
types of damages available under Title VII, plaintiffs who proved in-
tentional discrimination could obtain punitive and compensatory
damages; in contrast, plaintiffs who prevailed on a disparate impact
theory of liability could not obtain punitive or compensatory dam-
ages.7"
Despite these significant changes to Title VII, Congress did not
make similar amendments to the ADEA, and the ADEA continues to
67. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 106, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075
(1991).
68. Id.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l) (2000).
70. Id. § 1981a.
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lack the explicit disparate impact language found in Title VII. As dis-
cussed in Part V.B., the Wards Cove analysis continues to have force in
the ADEA context.
After these amendments to Title VII, courts began analyzing
disparate impact claims under that statute using a three-part frame-
work.7 First, the plaintiff must prove that a particular employment
practice has a significant disparate impact on a protected class.' Once
the employee establishes this prima facie case, both the burdens of
persuasion and production switch to the employer.73 The employer
must then establish that the challenged business practice is related to
the job in question and consistent with business necessity.74 If the
employer meets its burden, the employee can still prevail by demon-
strating that nondiscriminatory alternative employment practices exist
and the employer refused to adopt the alternate employment prac-
tice.75
E. Development of Disparate Impact Under the ADEA: Hazen
Paper
Prior to 1993, all of the circuits that considered the question of
whether a disparate impact claim existed under the ADEA deter-
mined that such a claim existed or at least assumed, without deciding,
that such a claim was viable.76
In 1993, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Hazen Paper Co.
v. Biggins,7 an ADEA disparate treatment case that resulted in signifi-
cant changes in ADEA disparate impact jurisprudence. In this case,
an employee claimed that he was terminated at the age of sixty-two,
apparently a few weeks short of the years of service he needed for his
pension to vest, so that the employer could avoid making pension
71. See, e.g., Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248, 265
(4th Cir. 2005) (discussing disparate impact framework under Title VII); Robinson
v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2001) (same);
Firefighter's Inst. for Racial Equality ex rel. Anderson v. City of St. Louis, 220 F.3d
898, 903-04 (8th Cir. 2000) (same).
72. Anderson, 406 F.3d at 265.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 161.
76. See infra Part IV.B.; see also Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 125 S. Ct. 1536,
1543 (2005) (noting that prior to Hazen Paper, the courts had uniformly recognized
a disparate impact claim under the ADEA).
77. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
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payments.7' After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
employee, finding that he had been intentionally discriminated
against in violation of the ADEA.79 The employer moved for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict, which the district court denied as
to plaintiff's federal claims.80 The First Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the judgment in favor of plaintiff Biggins, and the company
appealed the decision.
In ruling on Hazen Paper's appeal, the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether a plaintiff could establish a violation of the ADEA based
solely on evidence that the company may have terminated an em-
ployee based on his years of service with the company. In other
words, the Court was deciding whether consideration of an em-
ployee's years of service (which is sometimes correlated with an indi-
vidual's age) necessarily resulted in age discrimination. The Court re-
jected Biggins' argument, holding: "We now clarify that there is no
disparate treatment under the ADEA when the factor motivating the
employer is some feature other than the employee's age."'" The Court
further explained: "Because age and years of service are analytically
distinct, an employer can take account of one while ignoring the other,
and thus it is incorrect to say that a decision based on years of service
is necessarily 'age based."'8 2 The Court remanded the decision to the
First Circuit Court of Appeals for a determination of whether the jury
had sufficient evidence to find that Biggins was terminated based on
his age. 3
Hazen Paper was a disparate treatment case, which the Court
emphasized when it explicitly stated: "We have never decided
78. Id. at 606-07.
79. Id. at 606.
80. Id. at 607.
81. Id. at 609.
82. Id. at 611. The Court explained that although terminating an employee to
prevent his pension rights from vesting does not violate the ADEA, it would vio-
late the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Id. at 612.
83. The Hazen Paper case continued to have a long history. After remand from
the Supreme Court, the original First Circuit panel that considered the original ap-
peal determined that sufficient evidence of age discrimination existed to affirm the
jury's original verdict. Hazen Paper appealed this decision to the First Circuit en
banc, which reversed the panel decision and remanded the case to the trial court
for determination of whether a jury trial was appropriate. After denying summary
judgment on behalf of both parties, the trial court set the case for trial on the
ADEA count. The jury returned a verdict on behalf of the former employer Hazen
Paper, which was appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals. The First Circuit
Court of Appeals then affirmed the jury verdict. Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 111
F.3d 205, 207-08 (1st Cir. 1997).
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whether a disparate impact theory of liability is available under the
ADEA, and we need not do so here." 4 Nonetheless, the Hazen Paper
case came to have repercussions on ADEA disparate impact cases
based on the concurrence written by Justice Kennedy and joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist8" and Justice Thomas. In the brief concurring
opinion, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the Hazen Paper decision
related only to disparate treatment claims and not to disparate impact
claims.8 6 He further reiterated that
nothing in the Court's opinion should be read as incorporating in
the ADEA context the so-called "disparate impact" theory of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As the Court acknowledges,
we have not yet addressed the question whether such a claim is
cognizable under the ADEA, and there are substantial arguments
that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Ti-
tle VII to the ADEA. 7
As discussed in more detail in Part 1V.B., after Hazen Paper, dis-
parate impact case law under the ADEA developed erratically. After
Hazen Paper, the Second,88 Eighth,8 9 and Ninth Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals9° issued opinions upholding the use of the disparate impact the-
ory under the ADEA. 91 In 2001, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in the case of Adams v. Florida Power Corp.,92 which raised the issue of
whether disparate impact claims were viable under the ADEA. After
hearing oral argument from the parties, the Court dismissed the writ
of certiorari as improvidently granted. 93 By 2004, the First, Fifth, Sev-
enth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals had all issued
84. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610.
85. In 1981, Justice Rehnquist dissented from the Court's denial of certiorari
in the case of Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945 (1981), which raised the issue of
whether disparate impact claims existed under the ADEA.
86. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87. Id.
88. Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing disparate
impact claim because of statistical errors, but not precluding availability of cause
of action).
89. Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1466 (8th Cir. 1996) (recogniz-
ing that disparate impact claims are cognizable under ADEA); Pulla v. Amoco Oil
Co., 72 F.3d 648, 658 (8th Cir. 1995) (refusing to allow plaintiff to amend pleadings
to add claim of disparate impact with no discussion about the viability of the cause
of action); Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 958-59 (8th Cir. 1994) (analyzing
an ADEA claim brought under a disparate impact theory of liability).
90. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1271 (9th Cir. 2000) (ruling
that plaintiffs could not raise disparate impact because the claim was not made in
the complaint, but not contesting the availability of the cause of action).
91. Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1474(9th Cir. 1995).
92. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 534 U.S. 1054 (2001).
93. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 535 U.S. 228 (2002).
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opinions interpreting the ADEA to prohibit disparate impact claims,
developing a circuit split that would require resolution by the Su-
preme Court.94
III. The Supreme Court's Resolution: Smith v. City of
Jackson, Mississippi
On March 29, 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
case of Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi"' solely on the question of
whether a plaintiff could proceed on a disparate impact claim under
the ADEA.96 On March 30, 2005, the Supreme Court issued its deci-
sion in the case, recognizing that disparate impact is a viable claim
under the ADEA.97 Although the holding appeared to be a victory for
plaintiffs, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the petitioners' claims,
finding that they had not produced enough evidence to prevail on a
disparate impact claim.9"
A. Factual Background
In Smith, the petitioners were a group of police officers and po-
lice dispatchers who worked for the City of Jackson, Mississippi.9 9
The petitioners were challenging a new pay plan adopted by the city,
which granted raises to all city employees. One of the purposes of the
new pay plan was to increase the starting salaries of police officers to
bring them up to the regional average. To accomplish this goal, the
pay plan gave different levels of raises to employees depending on
their years of service with the city. Individuals who had less than five
years of tenure received proportionately greater raises than those with
more seniority.1"
Some of the officers with less than five years of service were over
the age of forty. However, because most of the officers with more
94. See Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 351 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2003); Ad-
ams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001); Mullin v. Raytheon
Co., 164 F.3d 696, 701 (1st Cir. 1999); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1009
(10th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076-79 (7th Cir.
1994).
95. 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).
96. 541 U.S. 958 (2004).
97. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1536.
98. See id. at 1546.
99. Id. at 1539.
100. Id.
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than five years of service were over the age of forty, the officers were
able to put forth statistics showing that older officers were disparately
impacted by the new pay plan. The officers filed suit under the
ADEA under two different theories--disparate treatment and dispa-
rate impact.
The district court granted summary judgment to the city on both
claims, holding that the plaintiffs had not established the intent neces-
sary to proceed on a disparate treatment claim and that a disparate
impact claim was not cognizable under the ADEA."1 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision on the disparate
treatment claim, finding that the plaintiffs were entitled to additional
discovery on the issue of intent and that summary judgment was
premature.10 2 In a split decision, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision relating to the cognizability of disparate impact
claims under the ADEA. 0' The police officers appealed this decision
to the Supreme Court.
B. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision in
part in an opinion that both recognized that a disparate treatment
claim may proceed under the ADEA and dismissed the petitioners'
claims."M The entire opinion, drafted by Justice Stevens, was joined by
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer."° Justice Scalia joined Parts I,
II, and IV of the opinion, and submitted a concurring opinion." Jus-
tices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas submitted an opinion concur-
ring in the judgment, but reasoned that the ADEA did not permit a
disparate impact claim."7 Chief Justice Rehnquist did not participate
in the decision." 8
In reaching this decision the majority opinion utilized a textual
analysis of the ADEA's key provisions and compared these provisions
with similar language in Title VII. The Court held that "[e]xcept for
substitution of the word 'age' for the words 'race, color, religion, sex,
101. Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 351 F.3d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 2003).
102. See generally id.
103. See generally id.
104. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1536.
105. Id. at 1538.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1549.
108. Id. at 1538.
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or national origin,' the language of [the operative] provision in the
ADEA is identical to that found in § 703(a)(2) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII)."'09
However, the Court noted two significant differences between
the two statutes. First, the ADEA permits an employer to take any
otherwise prohibited action "where the differentiation is based on rea-
sonable factors other than age.""' The Court referred to this provision
as the "RFOA provision." The majority opinion found that the RFOA
provision did not preclude plaintiffs from proceeding under a dispa-
rate impact theory;"' rather, the Court indicated that the RFOA provi-
sion precludes liability in a disparate impact case if an "adverse im-
pact was attributable to a nonage factor that was 'reasonable.'
112
The second major difference between Title VII and the ADEA is
the language contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which signifi-
cantly amended Title VII." 3 As discussed in Part II.D., this language
was added to Title VII in response to the Supreme Court's decision
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.1" Even though Congress statutorily
altered Title VII's burdens of persuasion and production through this
amendment, it did not make similar amendments to the ADEA."
5
To bolster its textual argument, the Court noted that if Congress
intended to bar all disparate impact claims under the ADEA, it could
have done so by using language identical to that found under the
Equal Pay Act. Under the Equal Pay Act, if a pay differential is based
"on any factor other than sex," the employer is not liable." 6 The ma-
jority reasoned that because the ADEA requires that the factor used be
"reasonable," disparate impact liability is not precluded."7 The Court
also reasoned that the Wirtz Report demonstrated Congress' intent to
remedy discrimination resulting from policies with a disparate im-
pact, and noted that the EEOC has consistently interpreted the ADEA
as recognizing such claims." 8
109. Id. at 1540.
110. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (2000); Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1541.
111. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544.
112. Id. at 1543.
113. See supra Part II.D. (discussing Title VII amendments).
114. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
115. See supra Part I.D.
116. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
117. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544.
118. Id. at 1544 & n.5.
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Finding that the dissimilarities between Title VII and the ADEA
do not affect whether a disparate impact cause of action exists under
the latter statute, the Court reasoned that such claims should be al-
lowed under the ADEA." 9 However, the majority then held that the
petitioners could not prevail under a disparate impact theory for two
reasons.
First, the Court found that the litigants had failed to identify a
specific test, practice, or requirement that caused the alleged discrimi-
nation.12 ° Second, the Court held that the city based its decision on
"reasonable factors other than age."'2 In so holding, the Court stated,
"[r]eliance on seniority and rank is unquestionably reasonable given
the City's goal of raising employees' salaries to match those in sur-
rounding communities. '
Finally, the majority opinion clarified the standard for determin-
ing when a defendant's actions will be considered a "reasonable factor
other than age." As discussed earlier, in the context of a Title VII dis-
parate impact claim, the plaintiff may prevail if he or she can establish
that the defendant could have adopted other methods to achieve its
goal that did not create a disparate impact on a protected group.
123
The Supreme Court clearly indicated that plaintiffs would not be enti-
tled to this option under the ADEA. Thus, the Court noted,
While there may have been other reasonable ways for the City to
achieve its goals, the one selected was not unreasonable. Unlike
the business necessity test, which asks whether there are other
ways for the employer to achieve its goals that do not result in a
disparate impact on a protected class, the reasonableness inquiry
includes no such requirement.
24
While the majority opinion provided plaintiffs with a victory by
recognizing disparate impact claims, it also identified significant hur-
dles that litigants would have to overcome in prevailing on such a
claim.
119. Id. at 1544.
120. Id. at 1545.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1546.
123. See, e.g., Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 161
(2d Cir. 2001); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2000).
124. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1546.
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C. Concurring in the Judgment
Three Justices concurred in the judgment affirming the dismissal
of the ADEA disparate impact claim; however, these Justices would
have found that the ADEA does not recognize disparate impact
claims.125 The concurrence did more than set forth a disagreement
over whether a disparate impact claim should exist under the ADEA.
Indeed, Justice O'Connor essentially set forth a roadmap for future de-
fendants to use in defending against disparate impact claims.
Relying on the Wirtz Report, the concurring opinion found that
"there often is a correlation between an individual's age and her abil-
ity to perform a job.' 126 This finding is in stark contrast to Title VII
disparate impact cases where it is generally assumed that there are
few cases when an individual's gender, race, national origin, or relig-
ion would correlate with the person's ability to perform a job. 7
The concurrence continued by describing four separate areas in
which age may correlate with the person's ability to perform a job.
First, the Justices noted that not only "physical ability generally de-
clines with age,', 128 but that mental capacity may also decline as
well.'29 The Justices further stated that "advances in technology and
increasing access to formal education often leave older workers at a
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis younger workers."" Finally, the
Justices noted that "employment benefits, such as salary, vacation
time, and so forth, increase as an employee gains experience and sen-
iority."131
The concurrence also reiterated that if litigants were to be al-
lowed to proceed on disparate impact claims under the ADEA, they
should be proceeding under the analysis set forth in the Court's deci-
sion in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio 32 As discussed in Part II.D.,
Congress amended Title VII to make clear that the Wards Cove analysis
125. Id. at 1549 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 1555.
127. Brief for the California Employment Law Council as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents, at *12-13, Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 125 S. Ct. 1536
(2005) (No. 03-1160), 2004 WL 1905737.
128. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1555 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129. Id.; Gregory v. Ashcroft 501 U.S. 452, 472 (1991).
130. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1555 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131. Id.
132. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1560 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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does not apply to disparate impact claims raised under that statute;
however, Congress did not make similar amendments to the ADEA.
The concurrence emphasized the different burdens that using a
Wards Cove analysis would place on plaintiffs in disparate impact
cases under the ADEA.133 Under the Wards Cove framework, the
plaintiff will first be required to establish that the application of a par-
ticular employment practice created a disparate impact.M Second, the
employer will be required to produce evidence that "its action was
based on a reasonable nonage factor."'" Finally, the plaintiff would
bear the burden of disproving the company's assertion.
13 6
The opinion thus dealt two important blows to future litigants
bringing disparate impact claims under the ADEA. First, it signaled
to lower courts that the defendant-friendly Wards Cove analysis ap-
plies to such claims. Second, the concurrence emphasized that differ-
ences exist between age discrimination and other types of claims that
justify closer scrutiny of disparate impact claims under the ADEA.
IV. Disparate Impact and Its Disfavored Status
As noted above, when the Smith decision was rendered, some
journalists and other commentators claimed that the case was a
"boon" for age discrimination claims. Such proclamations are, at best,
overstated. While Smith does provide litigants with a different avenue
to pursue age discrimination claims, the disparate impact theory itself
has not proven to be an attractive avenue for combating discrimina-
tion. Even prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, litigants
seeking to bring claims under a disparate impact theory faced many
challenges. These difficulties have resulted in a legal reality in which
disparate impact claims appear to be disfavored, and where litigants
prefer to combat discrimination through other frameworks.
The Smith case does not remove any of these obstacles in the age
context, and is unlikely to result in significant change regarding plain-
tiffs' fundamental aversion to disparate impact claims. This aversion
is even more likely to affect elderly workers, who have fewer eco-
nomic incentives to pursue disparate impact claims under the ADEA.
133. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1560 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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Additionally, more than half of the circuits had already recognized
the existence of such a claim prior to Smith.
A. Even Pre-Smith, Disparate Impact Was Not a Favored Theory
Even though the Smith decision definitively recognizes the vi-
ability of disparate impact claims under the ADEA, it does not change
the fact that plaintiffs have been wary of bringing disparate impact
claims in general. Whether proceeding under the ADEA, Title VII, or
the ADA, plaintiffs attempting to assert disparate impact claims face
many challenges that are not present in a typical intentional discrimi-
nation claim.
From a practical perspective, litigants and attorneys arguing a
disparate impact case face significant initial costs that are either absent
or are less significant in a disparate treatment case. These costs are a
direct result of the evidence that a plaintiff is required to establish in a
disparate impact case. To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must
establish that a particular employment practice created a disparate
impact on a protected group.'37 The primary method of establishing a
disparate impact claim is by the use of statistical evidence, which pre-
sents cost problems for plaintiffs."
First, the reliance on statistical evidence requires plaintiffs to ob-
tain large amounts of data from the defendant and other sources."9 In
an intentional discrimination case, the plaintiff is likely to possess at
least some information about the alleged discrimination and can pro-
vide evidence on his or her own behalf to support the claim. Addi-
tionally, the plaintiff may be able to obtain evidence from friendly co-
workers and other sources without seeking it from the defendant. In
contrast, the statistical evidence needed to establish a disparate impact
case is largely in the hands of the defendant and must be sought
137. Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248, 277 (4th Cir.
2005) (describing plaintiff's burden in establishing a prima facie case); Smith, 125 S.
Ct. at 1551 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same).
138. See, e.g., Lewis v. State of Del. Dep't of Pub. Instruction, 948 F. Supp. 352,
363 (D. Del. 1996) (dismissing disparate impact claim because plaintiff did not
provide a refined statistical analysis and an expert opinion to rebut statistics pre-
sented by the defendant); Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 766 F. Supp.
1052, 1101 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (refusing to consider class claims of disparate impact
because plaintiff failed to provide statistical experts and did not provide a detailed
statistical analysis).
139. See, e.g., Hill v. Miss. State Employment Serv., 918 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir.
1990).
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through the discovery process.' Defendants, of course, are often re-
luctant to produce this information voluntarily, causing costly discov-
ery disputes for both parties.'4 ' One court has described the process of
collecting and analyzing statistical evidence to support a disparate
impact claim as "both complex and arduous.',
142
Second, plaintiff's counsel are often required to retain statistical
experts to assist them in developing the statistical evidence and to
opine on the significance of the evidence. 43 In addition, the parties
may require the assistance of other experts, such as vocational experts,
to provide comparative statistics for a particular geographic area}
44
The services of these experts are expensive, 4 ' resulting in a significant
up-front cost for plaintiffs and their attorneys."
This additional investment in time and resources is not neces-
sary in an intentional discrimination case where the plaintiff is not re-
quired to put forth any statistical evidence. Although plaintiffs some-
times use statistics to bolster other evidence in intentional
discrimination cases, courts tend to be less stringent in examining
140. See, e.g., Vitug v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 883 F. Supp. 215, 222 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (noting that discovery is necessary to obtain statistical information to sup-
port disparate impact claim); see also Donna Meredith Matthews, Note, Employment
Law After Gilmer: Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Antidiscrimination Rights, 18
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 347, 384 (1997) (noting that disparate impact claims of-
ten require extensive discovery between the parties).
141. See, e.g., Gums v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 01-02972, 2003 WL
716240, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2003) (plaintiff arguing that defendant had
thwarted his efforts to obtain statistical information); Khan v. Sanofi-Synthelabo,
Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11423JSMDF, 2002 WL 31720528, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2002) (dis-
cussing discovery disputes arising in the context of disparate impact claims).
142. Hill, 918 F.2d at 1238 (quoting Wikins v. Univ. of Houston, 654 F.2d 388,
390 (5th Cir. 1981)).
143. See id.; see also Note, Building on McNamara v. Korean Airlines: Extending
Title VII and Disparate Impact Liability to Foreign Employers Operating Under Treatises
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 757, 783-84
(1991).
144. Reginald G. Govan, Honorable Compromises and the Moral High Ground: The
Conflicts Between the Rhetoric and the Content of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46
RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 41 (1993) (noting that industrial experts are often required in
disparate impact cases).
145. See, e.g., Denny v. Westfield State College, Civ. A. Nos. 78-2235-F, 78-3068-
F, 1989 WL 112823, at *7 (D. Mass. May 12, 1989) (noting that plaintiff's counsel
had paid statistical expert more than $11,000 for services rendered).
146. See id.; see also, e.g., Shari Engels, Problems of Proof in Employment Discrimi-
nation: The Need for a Clearer Definition of Standards in the United States and United
Kingdom, 15 COmp. LAB. L.J. 340, 363 (1994) (noting that hiring statisticians can be
expensive); Eileen R. Kaufman, Choosing the Insidious Path: West Virginia Univer-
sity Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey and the Importance of Experts in Civil Rights Litigation, 19
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 57,69 n.113 (1992).
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such evidence and often do not require expert analysis in such
cases.
147
Once the evidence is obtained and compiled, it is fairly common
for the court to carefully scrutinize statistical evidence for sampling
and other errors. As one court noted: "[W]e must be acutely aware
that spotting mistaken understandings or mischaracterizations of nu-
merical data either to suggest or to camouflage discrimination calls for
a finely tuned quantitative and qualitative eye."'O If a plaintiff's
counsel or the expert witness has made mistakes in developing the
statistical basis, the court will dismiss the disparate impact claims.
49
Developing the appropriate statistical evidence without errors is diffi-
cult, and dismissal for statistical error is common in disparate impact
cases.1
50
The high costs of presenting statistical evidence and the likeli-
hood that the court will scrutinize such evidence for errors provides
plaintiffs and their attorneys with a reduced incentive to pursue such
claims. In addition, plaintiffs have less of an economic incentive to
pursue disparate impact claims because the types of damages that can
be awarded in such cases are drastically different from the types of
remedies available in an intentional discrimination case.
In the Title VII context, the damages available to plaintiffs who
prevail on a disparate impact claim are statutorily limited. If a plain-
tiff prevails on an intentional discrimination claim under Title VII, the
plaintiff may obtain, among other types of relief, both compensatory
and punitive damages.15' In contrast, compensatory and punitive
damages are not available to a prevailing plaintiff in a disparate im-
147. See, e.g., Stratton v. Dep't for the Aging for City of New York, 132 F.3d
869, 877 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that expert analysis is not required for simple sta-
tistics offered in disparate treatment cases); Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d
760, 767 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that "in individual disparate treatment cases such as
this, statistical evidence, which 'may be helpful, though ordinarily not dispositive,'
need not be so finely tuned").
148. Hill v. Miss. State Employment Serv., 918 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir. 1990).
149. See, e.g., Diehl v. Xerox Corp., 933 F. Supp. 1157, 1167 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)
(dismissing disparate impact case because plaintiff's expert witness failed to ana-
lyze portions of available data); see also Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory
in Employment Discrimination: What's Griggs Still Good For? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS
L.J. 597, 597 (2004) (noting common errors made by plaintiffs' attorneys in present-
ing statistical evidence).
150. See Diehl, 933 F. Supp. at 1167; see also Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358
(2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing the disparate impact claim because statistics were
flawed).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000).
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pact case. 5 2 This compensation structure provides little incentive for
private attorneys to pursue disparate impact claims, compared to the
types of damages available under a disparate treatment cause of ac-
tion.
Although the ADEA does not contain a similar restriction on the
damages available in disparate impact cases, the damages available in
ADEA cases are already more substantially limited than those avail-
able in Title VII cases. In ADEA cases, prevailing plaintiffs may ob-
tain reinstatement or front pay, back pay, payment of wages owed,
injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, attorney's fees and costs.'53
Unlike Title VII, an ADEA plaintiff may not obtain punitive damages
or compensatory damages for emotional distress or for pain and suf-
fering." Instead of punitive damages, the ADEA allows prevailing
plaintiffs to obtain liquidated damages if the violation is willful.1
5
However, the liquidated damage amount is limited to an amount
equal to the back pay owed to the plaintiff.156
In theory, these same types of damages are available to plaintiffs
who prevail on a disparate impact claim. However, commentators
have noted that plaintiffs may have difficulty establishing willfulness
(and therefore entitlement to liquidated damages) in a disparate im-
pact case, where a violation can be proven without establishing any
intent to discriminate. 57 Even though litigants bringing disparate im-
pact claims under the ADEA have more comprehensive remedies than
similar Title VII litigants, these remedies are rather limited, especially
considering the financial and logistic difficulties associated with
mounting such a claim.
152. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 534-35 (1999) (discussing
damages available in Title VII disparate impact cases).
153. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000); Villescas v. Abraham, 311 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th
Cir. 2002).
154. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 326 (1995); Franzoni v. Hart-
marx Corp., 300 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2002).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Villescas, 311 F.3d at 1257.
156. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
157. For a good discussion about the difficulty of obtaining liquidated dam-
ages in a disparate impact case, see Jan W. Henkel, The Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act: Disparate Impact Analysis and the Availability of Liquidated Damages Af-
ter Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1183 (1997).
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As a result of these difficulties,5 8 some commentators believe
that disparate impact claims make up a small percentage of employ-
ment discrimination claims, amounting to just one employment dis-
crimination claim in fifty. 9 In the Title VII context, commentators
have noted that "[als a practical matter, disparate impact litigation
now plays a much smaller role than it once did in increasing employ-
ment opportunities for large numbers of nonwhite workers."'" Oth-
ers have noted that disparate impact claims are a "relatively less vital
tool, compared with theories of intentional discrimination. 161
B. Recognition of Disparate Impact Under the ADEA Alone May
Not Result in Radical Change
The recognition of a disparate impact cause of action alone does
not greatly enhance plaintiffs' ability to bring such claims. By the time
the Supreme Court decided the Smith case, the Second, 62 Sixth,"63
Eighth,"M and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals explicitly held that
158. For a discussion of other reasons the disparate impact theory may be un-
derutilized, see Shoben, supra note 149, at 607, and Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate
Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, WILLIAM & MARY L. REV., available at
http:/ /ssrn.com/abstract=751884 (last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
159. John J. Donohue & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 998 n.57 (1989). The lack of dispa-
rate impact cases also may increase the difficulty for attorneys trying to bring these
claims. Because courts have dealt with fewer disparate impact cases than dispa-
rate treatment cases, there are more areas of the law that remain unexplored. This
makes it more difficult and more expensive to proceed on such a claim. As one
commentator noted: "Disparate impact analysis is not a heavily litigated theory of
discrimination, and thus many questions remain relatively unsettled regarding the
nature of the plaintiff's proof .... Shoben, supra note 149, at 607.
160. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARv. L. REV. 493, 499 (2003).
161. Shoben, supra note 149, at 597.
162. Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 370 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing dispa-
rate impact claim because of statistical errors, but not precluding availability of
cause of action).
163. Wooden v. Bd. of Educ., 931 F.2d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1991) (discussing ele-
ments of disparate impact claim under the ADEA); Smith v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,
No. 90-5396, 1991 WL 11271, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 4, 1991) (finding that "claims under
the ADEA may be brought under either a disparate treatment or disparate impact
theory").
164. Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1470 (8th Cir. 1996) (recogniz-
ing that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA); Pulla v. Amoco
Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648, 658 (8th Cir. 1995) (refusing to allow plaintiff to amend plead-
ings to add a claim of disparate impact with no discussion about the viability of
the cause of action); Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 958-59 (8th Cir. 1994)
(analyzing an ADEA claim brought under a disparate impact theory of liability).
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disparate impact claims were allowed under the ADEA.165 The Third,
Fourth, and District of Columbia Circuits had not explicitly ruled on
the issue, but had issued opinions that at least were ambiguous as to
the ADEA's provision for disparate impact."6 Further, the strong cir-
cuit split on this issue developed only recently, meaning that litigants
in most circuits have only been foreclosed from raising such claims for
a relatively short amount of time.1
67
Importantly, the first indication at the circuit court level that dis-
parate impact claims might be in jeopardy was not published until
1994. That year, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
issue of whether the ADEA provided for disparate impact claims.168
In its opinion, the court indicated that the Supreme Court's holding in
Hazen Paper v. Biggins Co. 69 suggested that the ADEA did not allow
litigants to proceed under a disparate impact claim.' 70 While it is not
clear from the opinion whether the Seventh Circuit actually held that
disparate impact claims were no longer viable under the ADEA, other
courts regarded the Seventh Circuit's opinion as so holding. 7'
Prior to 1994, eleven of the circuit courts either allowed litigants
to proceed on a disparate impact theory of discrimination or at least
assumed for the sake of argument that the ADEA allowed such
165. Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1995).
166. Koger v. Reno, 98 F.3d 631, 639-40 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (assuming disparate
impact applied under ADEA); MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135,
1141, 1148 (3d Cir. 1988) (mentioning disparate impact claim under the ADEA);
Massarsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir. 1983) (assuming, with-
out deciding, that a disparate impact claim exists); see also Keplinger v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Va., No. 90-2434, 1991 WL 45484, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 5, 1991) (not-
ing that plaintiffs had not put forth evidence to support a disparate impact claim);
Arnold v. U.S. Postal Serv., 863 F.2d 994, 996, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (declining to con-
sider whether the ADEA recognizes disparate impact, but finding that the chal-
lenged policy did not have such an impact).
167. The five circuit courts that held that disparate impact was not allowed
under the ADEA were the First, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Courts of Ap-
peals. Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 351 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2003); Adams v.
Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001); Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164
F.3d 696, 701 (1st Cir. 1999); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1009 (10th
Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076-78, 1079 (7th Cir.
1994).
168. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1077.
169. 522 U.S. 952 (1997).
170. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1077; see also Hiatt v. Union Pac. R. Co., 65
F.3d 838,842 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing the Seventh Circuit's decision).
171. Hiatt, 65 F.3d at 838, 842 & n.2 (discussing the Seventh Circuit's decision).
In 2001, the Seventh Circuit definitively held that disparate impact claims were not
viable under the ADEA. Rummery v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 250 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2001)(holding disparate impact theory unavailable).
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claims.172 Even some of the circuit courts that later refused to recog-
nize a disparate impact claim under the ADEA continued to allow
such claims to proceed throughout most of the 1990s. For example, in
a 1993 case, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held: "[W]e believe the
prudent course is to merely assume the applicability of the disparate
impact analysis without deciding whether it is a viable theory of re-
covery under the ADEA."173 In a 1995 case, the Tenth Circuit declined
to consider the question of whether a disparate impact claim was vi-
able under the ADEA. 74 In 1994, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to consider whether such claims were viable under the
ADEA.' 75
Likewise, as late as 1995, both the First and Sixth Circuit Courts
of Appeals still assumed, without deciding, that a disparate impact
claim existed under the ADEA. 76 During that same year, the Third
Circuit expressed doubts about whether the disparate impact theory
172. See EEOC v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 999 F.2d 113, 114 (5th Cir. 1993) (not-
ing that the EEOC had alleged both disparate impact and disparate treatment
claims under the ADEA); Fisher v. Transco Servs.-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239,
1244 n.3 (Wth Cir. 1992); Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, 964 F.2d 106, 115 (2d Cir.
1992); Wooden v. Bd. of Educ., 931 F.2d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1991) (discussing ele-
ments of disparate impact claim under the ADEA); Keplinger v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Va., No. 90-2434, 1991 WL 45484, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 5, 1991) (noting that
plaintiffs had not put forth evidence to support a disparate impact claim); Smith v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., No. 90-5396, 1991 WL 11271, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 4, 1991) (find-
ing "[cilaims under the ADEA may be brought under either a disparate treatment
or disparate impact theory"); Abbott v. Fed. Forge, 912 F.2d 867, 871-72 (6th Cir.
1990); Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1423-25 (9th Cir. 1990); MacNa-
mara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1141 (3d Cir. 1988) (mentioning disparate
impact claim under ADEA); Arnold v. U.S. Postal Serv., 863 F.2d 994, 998 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (declining to consider whether ADEA recognized disparate impact, but
finding that challenged policy did not have such an impact); Jervolino v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 796 F.2d 1408, 1419 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that plaintiff had not al-
leged a disparate impact claim in the complaint); Massarsky v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
706 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir. 1983) (assuming, without deciding, that a disparate im-
pact claim exists); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980).
173. Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1428 (10th Cir. 1993).
However, the Court subsequently issued an opinion holding that disparate impact
claims could not be brought under the ADEA. Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73
F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding disparate impact claims "not cognizable" under
ADEA).
174. Hiatt, 65 F.3d at 842.
175. Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 772 n.4 (3d Cir. 1994).
176. Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., No. 95-1046, 1995 WL 414831, at *3 (1st Cir.
July 14, 1995) (assuming, arguendo, that a disparate impact claim could be as-
serted under the ADEA); Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n & Prof'l Staff Union, 53 F.3d
135, 140 (6th Cir. 1995) (expressing doubt about whether a cause of action exists,
but indicating that the circuit in the past recognized the viability of such claims).
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was viable, but declined to reach the issue.I" In 1998, the First Circuit
also suggested that disparate impact claims could not be raised under
the ADEA, but still assumed for the purposes of an opinion that such
a claim remained viable.78
Finally, even some of the circuit courts that ultimately decided
no disparate claim existed under the ADEA did not make that deci-
sion until fairly recently. For example, the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals did not decide the issue until 1999,"7 with the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reaching it in 2001.1° The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals' decision denying a disparate impact cause of action under the
ADEA was not handed down until 2003.181 Therefore, litigants have
only been precluded from bringing federal disparate impact claims in
fewer than half of the circuits for a relatively short period of time.
Even though the First, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals had eschewed the use of disparate impact
analysis, some states within those circuits continued to allow plaintiffs
to bring disparate impact claims based on age under state statutes.
8 2
Also important is the fact that even though plaintiffs may have been
limited in bringing disparate impact claims per se, courts within those
same circuits continued to allow litigants to raise evidence of dispa-
rate impact to support their disparate treatment claims. 183 Thus, em-
ployers still had incentives to limit the disparate impact their policies
had on workers over the age of forty.
The impact of the Smith decision's validation of the existence of
disparate impact claims under the ADEA is lessened by the fact that
less than half of the circuits had refused to allow disparate impact
177. See DiBiase v. Smnithkline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732 (3d Cir. 1995)
("[I]n the wake of Hazen, it is doubtful that traditional disparate impact theory is a
viable theory of liability under the ADEA.").
178. Bramble v. Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Providence Local, 135
F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 1998).
179. Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 701 (1st Cir. 1999).
180. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2001) (relying on
plain meaning of statute to finding disparate impact theory of liability unavailable
to ADEA plaintiffs).
181. Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 351 F.3d 183, 17 (5th Cir. 2003).
182. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 825 N.E.2d 522, 529 n.10 (Mass.
2005) (recognizing disparate impact claim for age discrimination under state stat-
ute).
183. See, e.g., Currier v. United Technologies Corp., 393 F.3d 246, 251 (1st Cir.
2004); Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62, 79 (1st Cir. 2004); Smith v. City of
Jackson, Miss., 351 F.3d 183, 193 n.12 (5th Cir. 2003).
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claims under the ADEA and that the circuit split existed for a rela-
tively short time period.
C. Elderly Employees as Potential Age Discrimination Plaintiffs
When looking at the group of potential plaintiffs who are at least
sixty years old, practical realities also may decrease both the ability to,
and the incentives for, filing age discrimination suits under either a
disparate impact theory or a disparate treatment theory. As discussed
below, elderly individuals make up a small percentage of the total
work force, leaving fewer individuals in this age group to prosecute
claims on their own behalf and to advocate for changes in disparate
impact law that may make it friendlier toward elderly litigants. In re-
duction-in-force cases, elderly workers are likely to be eligible for
early retirement or other severance incentives, which require them to
waive their ability to later raise age discrimination claims. Finally,
elderly plaintiffs may have less of an economic incentive than younger
workers to prosecute an age discrimination claim.
1. FEWER ELDERLY INDIVIDUALS PARTICIPATE IN THE WORK
FORCE
The recognition of a disparate impact cause of action may have
less of an impact on the elderly simply because there are fewer elderly
workers participating in the labor force than their counterparts aged
forty to fifty-nine. As noted by the U.S. Census Bureau in its report
We the People: Aging in the United States, the "percentage of older men
and older women in the labor force decreased steadily with age.
'
1
184
Work force statistics from 2004 provide a snapshot of the elderly's role
within the civilian work force.
In 2004, 147,401,000 individuals at least sixteen years old partici-
pated in the United States' civilian work force. Out of this work force,
75,758,000 individuals fell within the group of individuals protected
by the ADEA.'8 5 In other words, more than half of the individuals in
the civilian work force were within the ADEA's protected class.l"
During this same time period, the civilian work force consisted of
184. YVONNE J. GIST & LISA I. HETZEL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WE THE PEOPLE:
AGING IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2004).
185. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Popula-
tion Survey, http://www.bls.gov/data/home.htm (searched on July 5, 2005) (re-
sults on file with author).
186. Id.
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11,408,000 individuals who were sixty years old and older,187 which
comprised about 7.7% of the total civilian working population.
As shown in Chart 1, in 2004, approximately half (49.2%) of the
civilian work force that fell within the ADEA's protected age classifi-
cation was between the ages of forty and forty-nine years old. The
number of individuals within the protected class between the ages of
fifty and fifty-nine accounted for 35.7% of protected individuals. Of
the total number of individuals who fell within the ADEA's protected
class, only slightly more than 15% were aged sixty and older. Examin-
ing the group of elderly workers more specifically shows a rapid de-
cline in participation in the work force with age. While individuals in
their sixties account for 12% of protected individuals within the work
force, 8 ' less than 3% of workers within the protected class were over
the age of seventy.
Chart 1
Protected Individuals in Civilian Work Force by Age
Group for the Year 2004189
Number in civilian Percentage ofAge Range work force workers in ADEA
protected class
40 to 49 years 37,299,000 49.23%
old
50 to 59 years 27,051,000 35.71%
old
At least 60 11,408,000 15.06%
years old
TOTAL 75,758,000
One can draw three important observations from these statistics.
First, as would be expected, the elderly population comprises only a
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. All figures in Chart 1 were obtained from Bureau of Labor Statistics, La-
bor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, http://www.bls.gov/
data/home.htm (searched on July 5, 2005) (results on file with author).
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small portion of the total civilian work force. In the year discussed
above, the elderly comprised only 7.7% of the total civilian work force.
Second, even within the ADEA protected group itself, elderly workers
make up only a small percentage of the total number of protected
workers. Finally, the bulk of the elderly workers in the civilian work
force are in their sixties, with workers' participation in the civilian
work force dropping precipitously with increasing age.
2. ELDERLY WORKERS HAVE EARLY RETIREMENT OPTIONS
The availability of a disparate impact cause of action also may
affect elderly workers less than younger workers because elderly
workers are likely to be able to take advantage of early retirement and
other severance incentives that may not be available to their younger
counterparts. Workers who take severance and other incentives are
often required to sign agreements in which they waive their ability to
bring claims under the ADEA. 90
A survey of a decade's worth of disparate impact cases demon-
strates why early retirement incentives have special importance in
disparate impact cases. A review of the federal reported and unre-
ported decisions from 1995 to 2004 provides an interesting snapshot of
the types of cases pursued by individuals using the disparate impact
theory.' This research revealed 176 cases in which one or more
plaintiffs tried to assert age discrimination claims using a disparate
impact analysis.1
9 2
190. The ADEA specifically recognizes that employees may waive their rights
to bring age discrimination lawsuits and provides specific requirements for such a
waiver to be effectuated. 29 U.S.C. § 626(0(1) (2000); Oubre v. Entergy Operations,
Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 426 (1998) (describing the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act
(OWBPA)). If an employer does not comply with the requirements of the OWBPA,
the plaintiff can still file suit under the ADEA, even if the employee has signed an
agreement waiving such rights. Oubre, 522 U.S. at 426-28.
191. These cases were the result of a search on Westlaw for any case that con-
tained the terms "Age Discrimination in Employment Act" or "ADEA" within the
same paragraph as the term "disparate impact." This search resulted in 558 cases.
The author then read each of the cases to determine whether the court described
the case as raising a disparate impact claim under the ADEA. Cases in which the
court merely described disparate impact analysis or made reference to the ADEA's
analysis, even though the plaintiff was not asserting a disparate impact claim un-
der the ADEA, were not counted for analysis in this article.
192. The survey of the disparate impact case law is not designed to provide a
census of all of the disparate impact cases being considered by the federal courts
during this time period, as an exact count of all disparate impact cases is nearly
impossible. The author recognizes that some district court rulings are not reported
or available through electronic sources and that some cases are settled prior to any
VOLUME 13
DISPARATE IMPACT OR NEGATIVE IMPACT? 371
Of the 176 total cases, 74 (approximately 42%) of the cases in-
volved employees challenging termination and rehiring decisions re-
lating to reductions-in-force. Given the breadth of employment deci-
sions that can be challenged under a disparate impact analysis, the
fact that almost half of all such cases relate to reductions-in-force cre-
ates an interesting dynamic for understanding this type of claim.
The first phase of many reductions-in-force is the offering of
early retirement incentives to certain groups of employees.'93 Volun-
tary retirement is often offered to workers with a certain number of
years of service or those who have reached a certain age at the time of
a particular decision.194 Thus, older workers are often eligible to take
advantage of voluntary severance and retirement plans for which
their younger counterparts are not eligible.195 In exchange for these
early retirement incentives, companies usually require employees to
release all potential age discrimination claims they may have against
the company.1 96
written disposition. Additionally, this number naturally excludes cases that plain-
tiffs chose to voluntarily forego, based on their circuit's holding that disparate im-
pact claims were no longer viable. Rather, this data is designed to illustrate the
types of disparate impact cases being pursued.
193. See, e.g., Cerutti v. BASF Corp., 349 F.3d 1055, 1059 (7th Cir. 2003) (com-
pany offered early retirement to all individuals who worked for the company for
at least ten years and who were aged fifty-three and older); Michael J. Collins, It's
Common, But Is It Right? The Common Law of Trusts in ERISA Fiduciary Litigation, 16
LAB. LAW. 391, 400 (2001) (discussing use of early retirement incentives in reduc-
tions-in-force); Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination
Really Age Discrimination? The ADEA's Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780,
814 (1997) (noting the use of early retirement programs by companies to decrease
the expense of employees). It should be noted that some employees have brought
lawsuits claiming that a company used early retirement incentives as a way to get
rid of older workers and that these workers felt compelled to take the early retire-
ment or to risk subsequent termination without the retirement incentive. See, e.g.,
Cirillo v. Arco Chem. Co., 862 F.2d 448, 450-51 (3d Cir. 1988) (plaintiff claiming
that his placement in early retirement program was discriminatory).
194. Stephen F. Befort, The Labor and Employment Law Decisions of the Supreme
Court's 2003-2004 Term, 20 LAB. LAW. 177, 183 (2004) (noting that early retirement
incentives often are offered to individuals over the age of fifty-five or sixty).
195. See Stone v. Travelers Corp., 58 F.3d 434, 437 (9th Cir. 1995) (denying
plaintiff's age discrimination claim that he was denied ability to participate in sev-
erance plan because he was fifty-five years old, and thus too young to participate
in the plan); Karlen v. City Cols. of Chi., 837 F.2d 314, 314 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
that employer may create incentive plan that favors older employees); State Police
for Automatic Ret. Ass'n v. Difava, 164 F. Supp. 2d 141, 152 (D. Mass. 2001) (ex-
plaining that retirement incentives that favor older workers over younger workers
are not prohibited by the ADEA).
196. Befort, supra note 194 (noting that employees are typically required to
waive their right to later file suit).
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While some litigants have challenged the use of early retirement
plans as a way for companies to terminate older workers, 97 these pro-
grams have usually met with success. Separations from employment
resulting from early retirement incentives are less likely to result in
litigation compared to involuntary terminations, and employees ac-
cept early retirement incentives as a normal part of a reduction-in-
force. 9
Because many workers over the age of sixty are offered and ac-
cept early retirement benefits in exchange for waiving their rights to
file suit against their former employers, fewer of these employees are
within the available plaintiff pool for a disparate impact claim based
on a reduction-in-force.
3. ELDERLY WORKERS HAVE LESS POTENTIAL DAMAGES
In addition to early retirement options, workers over the age of
sixty also may have less economic incentive to sue. In age discrimina-
tion cases, both back pay and front pay are determined by reference to
the "working life" of the individual.' In other words, if an individ-
ual was sixty years old at the time of the alleged discrimination, and
the individual anticipated retiring at the age of sixty-two, that indi-
vidual's front pay and back pay awards would be limited to a two-
year time window. The limited time period for which damages may
be obtained diminishes the economic incentive for both the plaintiff
and any potential plaintiff's attorney to bring such claims.
Further, in age discrimination cases, liquidated damages are tied
to the amount of back pay awarded to the plaintiff.2 "° Even though
the illegal termination of an older worker may draw the ire of the
judge or jury (as compared to the termination of a younger individual
within the protected class), the jury and the court's ability to compen-
sate the older victim is limited.
197. See, e.g., Cirillo, 862 F.2d at 450-51 (plaintiff claiming that his placement in
early retirement program was discriminatory).
198. See, e.g., Pamela Perun, Phased Retirement Programs for the Twenty-First Cen-
tury Workplace, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 633, 645 (2002) (discussing early retirement
incentives).
199. Kulling v. Grinders for Indus., Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 800, 813 (E.D. Mich.
2002) (discussing front pay award with an upper limit as the date the plaintiff an-
ticipated no longer working); Vogl v. Arrow Pattern & Foundry Co., No. 93 C
3846, 1994 WL 162807, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 1994).
200. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000); McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513
U.S. 352, 357-58 (1995) (discussing ADEA's liquidated damages provision).
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Consider a scenario where a sixty-four-year-old employee is ter-
minated on the basis of her age. If the individual planned on retiring
at the age of sixty-five, she would only be eligible for one year of back
pay and to have that award doubled, if liquidated damages are ap-
propriate. In contrast, a younger employee would be able to obtain
back pay from the date of termination until the date of the verdict.2"'
As the average employment case takes between eighteen months and
three years to reach trial,2 °2 younger workers in the protected class
may obtain far more significant back pay and liquidated damages
awards than their counterparts nearing retirement.
Additionally, an employer may argue that an employee's declin-
ing health should limit damage awards.2 °3 In other words, the em-
ployer would argue that the employee is not entitled to back pay or
front pay because the employee's health would have limited his or her
ability to work. This argument may be more effective against older
workers protected by the ADEA because older Americans are more
likely to report that illness or disability affects their day-to-day activi-
ties. Census data indicates that "the disability rate of the population
65 and over was at least three times the rate of the total.2" The popu-
lation 65 and over reported mental disabilities at twice the rate of the
total population. 2 5 More specifically, thirteen percent of individuals
aged sixty-five to seventy-four reported that they had a disability that
caused them difficulties going outside their home, with this number
increasing to forty-seven percent for people over the age of eighty-
five .206
Given the limited amount of available damages, individuals over
the age of sixty (and, importantly, plaintiff's attorneys) are less likely
to view an age discrimination lawsuit as economically efficient and
may have less incentive to raise age discrimination claims in gen-
201. Drase v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 1077, 1080 (N.D. Il. 1994) (noting ap-
propriate time period for awarding back pay).
202. See, e.g., Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, An Empirical Study of Dis-
pute Resolution Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights, DISPUTE
RES. J., Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004, at 56-57; Cecilia H. Morgan, Employment Dispute Reso-
lution Process, 11 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 31, 32 (2004).
203. See, e.g., Dix v. Thompson Newspapers GA, Inc., 1:90-CV-351-RHH, 1991
WL 33205, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 1991) (awarding only two months of back pay
because plaintiff became disabled shortly after termination of employment).
204. GIST & HETZEL, supra note 184, at 11.
205. Id. at 11 fig.14.
206. Id. at 11.
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eral.2 °7 Given the added expense required to hire statistical experts
and gather data in a disparate impact case, the economic calculus may
be even less appealing for individuals over the age of sixty.
V. Smith Raises New Challenges for All Disparate
Impact Plaintiffs, Especially Elderly Plaintiffs
As discussed in Part IV, elderly workers may be less likely to
bring suit under the ADEA for systemic reasons. However, even
those individuals aged sixty and over who do file lawsuits will find
that the Smith decision, while ostensibly favoring plaintiffs, creates
new hurdles for plaintiffs in proving their claims. Although many of
these obstacles will impact all litigants bringing disparate impact
claims, the following discussion focuses on the ways in which these
obstacles will affect elderly litigants.
A. After Smith, Defendants Will Be More Likely to Aggressively
Challenge the First Prong of the Disparate Impact Test
To establish a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff is first required
to prove that a specific employment practice caused a disparate im-
pact on individuals within the protected class.2 °s Thus, within the
prima facie case, the plaintiff must demonstrate two separate ele-
ments: (1) a specific practice (2) created a disparate impact on a par-
ticular group of people. Language in the Smith decision may encour-
age defendants and courts to be more aggressive in requiring
plaintiffs to meet heightened standards of proof in each of these areas.
1. MORE DEFENDANTS WILL CHALLENGE WHETHER A SPECIFIC
PRACTICE IS IDENTIFIED
In Smith, the plaintiffs contested the legality of a pay plan that
gave workers with less seniority a greater percentage wage increase
than those with more seniority. 2 9 The pay plan at issue would have
allowed officers to progress through a series of five steps with increas-
207. Additionally, an elderly individual's eligibility for Social Security, Medi-
care, or other retirement benefits may even further reduce the employee's eco-
nomic incentive to pursue litigation.
208. See, e.g., Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 241 F.3d 948, 953 (8th Cir.
2001) (describing prima facie case).
209. Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1545 (2005).
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ing salary based on their performance reviews.10 When the plan was
initially implemented, officers were placed in the salary rung that
would provide them with at least a two percent increase over their
salary before the plan's implementation.2 However, the rungs in
which the less senior officers were placed gave them more than a two
percent pay increase.2 2
Despite the fact that the plaintiffs were challenging the imple-
mentation phase of a fairly simple pay plan, the Court held that the
plaintiffs could not prevail because they had "not identified any spe-
cific test, requirement, or practice within the pay plan that has an ad-
verse impact on older workers." '213 The majority continued that "it is
not enough to simply allege that there is a disparate impact on work-
ers, or point to a generalized policy that leads to such an impact.
'Rather, the employee is responsible for isolating and identifying the
specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any
observed statistical disparities."214
Given the simplicity of the implementation phase of the pay
plan, it is difficult to comprehend how the plaintiffs could have been
more specific regarding their allegations. The implementation of the
pay plan simply required the police department to place officers in the
correct salary grade, depending on their current salary. It was clear
that this was the policy that the plaintiffs were challenging. Indeed,
the court of appeals assumed that the plaintiffs could establish a
prima facie case if disparate impact was a viable cause of action under
the ADEA.215
Although the plaintiffs were required to identify a particular
practice or policy prior to Smith, the Supreme Court's denial of relief
in Smith based on plaintiffs' failure to identify a particular employ-
ment practice signals to defense attorneys and lower courts that this
prong of the test should be carefully scrutinized, perhaps more so
than in the past. Added scrutiny to the first part of the prima facie
case will make it more difficult for plaintiffs to proceed on disparate
impact claims for several reasons.
210. Joint Appendix at *15, *21, Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 125 S. Ct. 1536(2005) (No. 03-1160), 2004 WL 2289230.
211. Id. at *20.
212. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545.
213. Id.
214. Id. (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)).
215. Id. at 1540.
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First, it will make it more difficult for plaintiffs' counsel to de-
termine the likelihood of success on a given claim. Potential plaintiffs
seeking legal advice often do not possess detailed information about
the specific workings of company policies. Instead, plaintiffs seek ad-
vice with more generalized information, i.e., "I was terminated during
a reduction-in-force and other people in my protected class were also
terminated." It is not until the discovery phase that plaintiffs' counsel
will have access to the data and employer policies that will allow the
attorney to determine whether specific portions of a policy caused a
disparate impact. The more detailed the courts require plaintiffs to be
in identifying the particular practice at issue, the more work that will
be required of plaintiffs' counsel to learn the practices of the employer
defendant and to gather the appropriate statistical information, and
the less information that plaintiffs and lawyers will have in making a
decision about whether a claim is viable.
Second, an increased focus on specific policies and practices will
require extra diligence on behalf of plaintiffs' counsel in compiling
and gathering statistical data. As discussed above, mistakes by either
plaintiffs' counsel or a statistical expert are common reasons for dis-
missal of disparate impact claims.216 If plaintiffs gather data on a more
generalized practice of the employer, rather than focusing on a spe-
cific practice or policy, this would be an additional reason to dismiss
the claim. Although this same problem was present prior to Smith, the
Supreme Court's focus on the first prong of the test makes challenges
on these grounds more likely now than in the past.
While all potential plaintiffs are impacted by any analysis that
makes disparate impact claims harder to bring, elderly plaintiffs are
more greatly affected by such a change because of the systemic reali-
ties that already discourage the bringing of such suits. Thus, plain-
tiffs' lawyers deciding whether to bring a case will have one addi-
tional difficulty to consider. In a case where the existence of or
amount of damages is already limited by the plaintiff's age and where
the costs of gathering statistical information are high, plaintiffs' coun-
sel may think twice about launching a disparate impact claim on be-
half of an elderly client.
Further, focus on a more narrowly defined practice may make it
more difficult for elderly plaintiffs to establish that a company's policy
216. See supra Part V.A.
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has a disparate impact on elderly workers alone. This is because the
more narrow a practice being challenged, the fewer people who are
likely to fall within the group challenged by the practice. For elderly
workers, who already make up only a small portion of the employed
population, it will be more difficult to establish a statistically signifi-
cant disparity if the number of individuals affected by the practice is
even smaller.217
To clarify this idea, consider the following hypothetical. A com-
pany decides that it needs to reduce its work force and directs com-
pany managers to lay off employees based on the following criteria:
(1) the needs within the individual working unit for the position in
question; (2) the prior performance evaluations of the employees; and
(3) the potential the employee has to learn new skills that would be
transferable within the company. As a result of the reduction-in-force,
nearly all of the elderly individuals within the company are laid off.
However, consistent with national statistics, the company did not
have very many elderly employees prior to the reduction-in-force.
In this hypothetical, even if the employees could argue that the
reduction-in-force itself was the discriminatory practice, they would
have a difficult time proving that their population size was large
enough to create a proper statistical disparity. However, if the work-
ers are required to show that one of the three selection criteria created
a disparate impact, they will have an even more difficult time estab-
lishing a large enough statistical group, especially if the reasons for
the employees' layoffs were fairly evenly distributed between the
three criteria.
Any additional focus on the first prong of the prima facie case
will discourage elderly plaintiffs and their attorneys from bringing
disparate claims and will also decrease their likelihood of prevailing
on these claims.
217. It is unclear whether the plaintiffs prosecuting disparate impact claims
under the ADEA will be able to assert that an entire process results in a disparate
impact if individual portions of a process are not able to be analyzed separately.
Title VII specifically provides that if "the elements of a respondent's decision-
making process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decision-making
process may be analyzed as one employment practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(B) (2000). The Court did not address whether this option was available
under the ADEA.
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2. COURTS MAY BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO THE ARGUMENT THAT
NON-AGE FACTORS MAY CREATE A DISPARATE IMPACT
As discussed above, the primary evidence in a disparate impact
case is statistical evidence showing that a particular policy creates a
significant disparity for members of a protected group.218 In Smith, the
Court emphasized that the plaintiff's burden is not merely to demon-
strate that a statistical disparity exists, but to demonstrate that it was
the employer's specific policy or practice that led to the discrepancy.
This was the law prior to Smith,219 and Smith does not change this por-
tion of the plaintiff's proof. However, what Smith did do is place dis-
parate impact claims based on age in a separate, and arguably lesser,
category from other such claims.
In its opinion, the Court indicated that two factors separate
ADEA disparate impact claims from those brought under Title VII.
First, when the protected trait is gender, religion, national origin, or
race, there should be little correlation between the protected trait and
a person's qualifications for a position. 2° In other words, if a certain
employment practice has a disparate impact on any of these groups,
one of the likely explanations for this statistical disparity is discrimi-
nation. As the California Employment Law Council argued in its
amicus brief in support of the City of Jackson: "The burden this sort of
[disparate impact] analysis imposes on employers is ameliorated by
the very rarity with which racial or gender disparities ought to oc-
cur. 11221
However, the Court made it clear that it considered age to be dif-
ferent than other protected traits. As discussed during the oral argu-
ments in the Smith case, age is different than the traits protected by Ti-
tle VII because it is "inherently correlated with myriad selection
practices." '222 Both the majority opinion and the concurrence in Smith
218. See supra Part W.A.
219. See, e.g., Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 749 (9th Cir. 2003) (ex-
plaining that plaintiff must challenge a specific practice); Fisher v. Transco Servs.-
Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 1992).
220. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544.
221. Brief for the California Employment Law Council as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents, supra note 127, at *12-13.
222. Transcript of Oral Argument at *26, Smith, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (No. 03-1160),
2004 WL 2607536 ("In the age context, as Justice Breyer pointed out in the Florida
Power argument, as he's pointed out again today, age is inherently correlated with
myriad selection practices. It's painful to say, particularly to a Court that's a little
bit older than I am, but our mental and physical capacities are not constant over
our lifetimes. They're different for each one of us, but statistically they change
over time and they deteriorate over time, and progress doesn't treat the skills and
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agreed with this contention,223 with the concurring opinion even list-
ing four areas-physical ability, mental ability, technological knowl-
edge, and employment benefits-in which employers may reasonably
make decisions that correlate with age.2 24 Phrased differently by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals: "Everyone knows that younger
people are on average more comfortable with computers than older
people are, just as older people are on average more comfortable with
manual-shift cars than younger people are."225
This reasoning provides a stark contrast to Title VII cases, where
the Court has routinely decried the application of stereotypes and has
instead focused on the abilities or characteristics of the individuals
appearing before the Court. For example, in City of Los Angeles, De-
partment of Water & Power v. Manhart, the Court was faced with the
question of whether a city could require female workers to make lar-
ger contributions to a pension plan based on the fact that women gen-
erally outlive men.226 While the Court agreed that women as a group
have a longer lifespan than men, this argument did not prevail. The
Court noted:
It is equally true, however, that all individuals in the respective
classes do not share the characteristic that differentiates the aver-
age class representatives. Many women do not live as long as the
average man and many men outlive the average woman. The
question, therefore, is whether the existence or nonexistence of
"discrimination" is to be determined by comparison of class char-
acteristics or individual characteristics.
22 7
The Court held that the city's practice was discriminatory because it
treated women differently than men.228
It appears that in the age context more so than in other discrimi-
nation cases, the courts will be more likely to question the cause of
any statistical disparity and to believe that such disparities are the re-
sult of legitimate factors. Thus, courts will not only be looking at
whether plaintiffs can establish that a particular practice resulted in a
statistical disparity, but also whether the statistical disparity is caused
abilities that we have with-the same way to people who are at different stages in
life.").
223. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545, 1555.
224. Id. at 1555.
225. Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997).
226. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704
(1978).
227. Id. at 708.
228. Id. at 711.
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by discrimination. In other words, "[uinlike with Title VII, where ra-
cial, religious, or gender disparities are presumed to be both few and
inherently suspicious, age-correlated disparities in the workplace are
almost certain to be both innocent and commonplace."229
An increased acceptance of the fact that a statistical disparity
may not necessarily be the result of discrimination is more problem-
atic for elderly plaintiffs than for others within the ADEA's protected
class. If courts believe that an employee's physical ability, mental ca-
pacity, and ability to adapt to technological change decreases with
age, this perception will be even more severe when looking at a class
of litigants over the age of sixty, rather than a larger class of individu-
als over the age of forty.
Further, even the employees bringing the Smith case recognized
the "relatively innocuous nature of ageism," compared with other
types of discrimination, in that age "distinctions are particularly
unique because they so often are used thoughtlessly rather than as in-
tentional expressions of invidious malice or even mildly bigoted in-
tent."2" As commentators cited in the petition for writ of certiorari
described:
Age-related biases ... may have become so routinized that they
may influence social judgments at a level below that at which we
consciously ascribe traits to others. Such "automatic" ageism may
be hard to eradicate if it has been incorporated into our implicit
personality theories or social schemata and is evoked without
awareness on our part.
231
While this argument weighs in favor of recognizing a cause for
disparate impact under the ADEA, it may also cause courts to be more
skeptical of these types of claims. Even though intent to discriminate
is not required to be proved in a disparate impact case, evidence of in-
tentional discrimination can be used to bolster a conclusion that the
statistical disparity resulted from the individual's membership in a
protected class. If a court is trying to determine whether the reason
229. Brief for the California Employment Law Council as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents, supra note 127, at *15.
230. Brief for the AARP et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *23,
Smith, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (No. 03-1160), 2004 WL 1356592; see also Howard Eglit, The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act's Forgotten Affirmative Defense, 66 BOSTON L.
REV. 155, 222 (1986).
231. Brief for the AARP et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra
note 230, at *24 (quoting Charles W. Perdue & Michael B. Gurtman, Evidence for the
Automaticity of Ageism, 26 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 199, 201
(1990)).
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for a statistical disparity is discrimination, it may instinctually (and
probably not explicitly) view the absence of any intent to discriminate
as bolstering the defendant's viewpoint that no discrimination oc-
curred. This is especially so if the court is already inclined to believe
that the statistical disparity was more likely caused by a reasonable
factor, and not discrimination.
Given the potential correlation between age and other legitimate
factors, the Supreme Court's reemphasis of this fact, and the likeli-
hood that a disparate impact plaintiff will not be able to put forth any
evidence of intentional discrimination to bolster an age claim, it is
likely that courts will scrutinize disparate impact statistics more in age
discrimination than in other contexts because the statistical disparity
alone may not be suspect. Thus, courts faced with statistics showing
that a particular practice resulted in disparate treatment based on age
may be reluctant to find in favor of the plaintiff. As one court ex-
plained: "[i]n the age context, courts should be skeptical that statistical
disparity alone results in age discrimination.
23 2
B. Plaintiffs Will Face a More Onerous Burden of Proof
While the purpose of the Smith case was to determine whether
disparate impact analysis was appropriate,23 the National Employ-
ment Lawyers Association (NELA), a group of lawyers representing
plaintiffs in employment litigation, and the Chamber of Commerce
anticipated that once disparate impact was recognized, the real con-
flict would arise over the questions of "reasonableness" and the ap-
propriate burdens to be allocated to each party.2
3
As discussed in Part II.D., the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended
Title VII to clarify that the plaintiff only has the initial burden of estab-
lishing that a statistical disparity exists. The burdens of both produc-
tion and persuasion then switch to the employer to establish that its
actions were taken as a "business necessity." The employer's burden
232. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001).
233. Brief of the Petitioners at *2, Smith, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (No. 03-1160), 2004 WL
1369172 (indicating that sole question for the court was whether disparate impact
claims are ever cognizable).
234. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at *2, Smith, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (No. 03-1160),
2004 WL 1905736; Brief for the National Employment Lawyers Ass'n and the Trial
Lawyers for Public Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *24-25,
Smith, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (No. 03-1160), 2004 WL 1378336.
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on this second prong is quite onerous and requires the employer to
establish that the practice is related to the job in question and neces-
sary to the business. Even if the employer prevails on this prong, the
employee has the ability to prevail by establishing that an alternate
business practice exists that achieves the same result as the discrimi-
natory policy, but does not result in a disparate impact on the pro-
tected group.
However, this analysis is completely different than the analysis
set forth by the Supreme Court in its Wards Cove decision. Recall that
Congress amended Title VII to clarify that the Wards Cove analysis
should not be used in Title VII cases, but did not make similar
amendments to the ADEA. The concurring opinion in Smith empha-
sized that the result of this legislative history is that the Wards Cove
analysis applies in ADEA disparate impact cases.235
Thus, under the Wards Cove analysis, the burden of persuasion at
all times remains with the plaintiff. The only burden that the defen-
dant would have would be to articulate a legitimate basis for its ac-
tions.' Placing the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff would be a
significant difference between disparate impact claims under the
ADEA and disparate impact claims under Title VII and is a serious
obstacle to all plaintiffs pursuing such age discrimination claims.
Not only will the burden of persuasion remain on the plaintiff,
the defendant's burden to produce evidence of a reasonable basis for
its procedure or policy will be lighter than it is in the Title VII context.
As the majority opinion in Smith noted, the employer is only required
to provide a reasonable basis for its actions.37 This is much different
than demonstrating the business justification necessary under Title VII
cases, where the defendant is required to establish "that the chal-
lenged practice is job related for the position in question and consis-
tent with business necessity."'  Further, unlike in Title VII cases, the
plaintiff will not be able to prevail in an ADEA disparate impact case
by showing that the employer could have adopted an alternative,
nondiscriminatory practice. 9 The absence of this option removes an-
235. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1560.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248, 277 (4th Cir.
2005) (Gregory, Cir. J., dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(a)(i) (2000)).
239. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1560.
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other possible basis for victory from the plaintiff's disparate impact
arsenal.
The use of the Wards Cove framework, as well as the requirement
that an employer's decision only be based on reasonable factors, pro-
vides the defendant in an ADEA disparate impact case with a distinct
advantage. As discussed above, as elderly plaintiffs already have re-
duced incentives to pursue disparate impact claims and may have a
greater difficulty proving statistically significant disparities, placing a
higher burden of proof on plaintiffs only creates an additional incen-
tive not to pursue disparate impact claims.
Additionally, given the Court's recognition that age often corre-
lates with a person's mental capacity, physical ability, employment
benefits, and ability to adapt to technological changes, it is likely that
policies that create a disparate impact on the elderly will be found to
be reasonable as long as they rationally relate to one of these four
traits and are not based strictly on an individual's age.240 Smith itself
recognizes that policies relating to an employee's years of service or
seniority are likely to be held reasonable.241
Under the current framework, elderly workers are not likely to
pursue disparate impact claims. Even if a plaintiff did not waive his
or her claims after receiving early retirement or a severance, it is
unlikely that the amount of possible recovery would provide an in-
centive for an individual or an attorney to file suit. Even if a monetary
incentive is present, the plaintiff still faces the onerous task of collect-
ing and analyzing the proper statistics. This task is made even more
difficult by the Smith Court's emphasis on a specific employment
practice. If a practice only affects elderly workers, it is unlikely that
enough individuals will be affected by it to create a statistically sig-
nificant disparity. Even if such a disparity does exist, Smith provides
courts with a basis to disbelieve that the disparity resulted from dis-
crimination and justifies a finding that the employer's practice was
reasonable. After Smith, plaintiffs do indeed have the right to proceed
on a disparate impact claim, but it is unlikely that many elderly liti-
gants will want to do so.
240. The author is not expressing agreement with this proposition, but is
merely noting that courts are likely to hold that policies that create a disparate im-
pact based on age are likely to be upheld as reasonable.
241. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1543.
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VI. The Silver Lining in the Dark Cloud: Some Hope for
Elderly Employees
Even with the limits placed on disparate impact liability, the ex-
istence of a cause of action for disparate impact alone may help older
employees by encouraging companies to highly scrutinize termination
and other decisions that may have an adverse effect on older employ-
ees. Companies certainly have an incentive to avoid costly litigation,
even if they believe that they would ultimately prevail on the mer-
its.2
42
Further, the Smith case provides employers who do not want to
discriminate against an individual based on age additional induce-
ment to reexamine policies and procedures that may create a dispa-
rate impact. For example, the recognition of a disparate impact cause
of action may encourage employers to use methods other than termi-
nation when trying to cut costs and payroll during a reduction-in-
force. Commentators have suggested that employees with more sen-
iority be given an option of taking a cut in salary243 or be given a right
of first refusal for other jobs within the company for which the indi-
vidual is qualified.2' These alternative methods of cutting pay "tend
to show that it was simply cost-and not age-that motivated the em-
ployer.""2 4  Only time will tell whether employers will adopt these
methods in response to Smith; however, the existence of a cause of ac-
tion at least provides employers with a minimal incentive to do so.
As noted by the petitioner's attorney during oral argument in
the Smith case: "an important part of impact liability is just making
242. Brief for the California Employment Law Council as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents, supra note 127, at *16 ("And even if it were true that defen-
dants usually would win on the merits, litigation is costly, and class litigation can
be ruinously so. The potential damages in a discrimination class action can push
defendants to settle even the weakest of claims."); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advi-
sory committee notes to 1998 amendments (noting that "[an order granting certi-
fication, on the other hand, may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the
costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability");
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 163-64 (3d
Cir. 2001); Blair v. Equifax Check Servs. Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[A]
grant of class status can put considerable pressure on the defendant to settle, even
when the plaintiff's probability of success on the merits is slight.").
243. Michael Higgins, Success Has Its Price: Courts OK Firing Older, Higher-Paid
Workers to Save Money, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998, at 34, 35; Kester Spindler, Shareholder
Demands for Higher Corporate Earnings Have Their Price: How Courts Allow Employers
to Fire Older Workersfor Their Achievement, 27 PEPP. L. REv. 807, 808 (2000).
244. Spindler, supra not 243, at 824.
245. Higgins, supra note 243, at 35.
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employers think about it .... [Dlisparate impact... acts as a spur or
catalyst to cause employers to self-examine and self-evaluate their
employment practices to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the
last vestiges of discrimination."2"
VII. Conclusion
At best, the Smith decision is a mixed result for older workers.
On the positive side, the Smith decision recognizes disparate impact as
a possible claim under the ADEA and provides companies with an in-
centive to create policies that do not have a disparate impact on older
workers. However, the case also places many obstacles in the way of
litigants who want to challenge such policies. Once litigation ensues,
ADEA disparate impact plaintiffs bear a greater burden of persuasion
and production than their counterparts in the Title VII context. This
change alone will lessen the incentives for older workers and their at-
torneys to pursue disparate impact claims based on age.
Elderly litigants in particular are most affected by the procedural
and other hurdles now present in the ADEA disparate impact context.
As discussed above, the damages structure of the ADEA already pro-
vides workers nearing retirement with less ability to recover economic
damages, and thus, less incentive to pursue age discrimination claims
in the courts. Additionally, there are fewer elderly employees in the
workplace, making it difficult for these workers to establish that a
practice has a statistically significant impact on them. Given these
practical realities, the Smith decision's tilting of the burdens of pro-
duction and persuasion in favor of defendants makes it even less
likely that elderly workers will prevail on a disparate impact claim.
Perhaps even more problematic for elderly litigants is the under-
lying skepticism in the Smith case regarding the relationship between
statistical disparities and discrimination. Unlike in Title VII claims,
where the courts have found that discrimination is the likely explana-
tion for employment practices that create gross statistical disparities,
the Smith decision emphasized that this is not the case in age dis-
crimination cases. In fact, the Court went even further by recognizing
that in many instances a person's age will permissibly correlate with a
myriad of factors.
246. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 222, at *55.
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Even if an elderly worker has enough economic incentive to file
suit, can find an attorney who shares the same belief, and is able to
produce evidence of a statistical disparity, the district courts will be
able to rely on the Smith decision to reject the plaintiff's explanation
for the statistical disparity and find that the employer's proffered rea-
son for its action was reasonable. While Smith recognizes disparate
impact as a cause of action, it does little else to help aggrieved work-
ers, especially the elderly.
